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Workload Case |
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AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, CENTRAL STATE UNIVERSITY
CHAPTER, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT, v. [Cite
as Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Cent. Education - State
universities - Faculty workload policies - R.C. 3345.45 violates the Equal
Protection Clauses of the R.C. 3345.45 violates the
Equal Protection Clauses of the APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from
the Court of Appeals for Plaintiff-appellee and
cross-appellant, American Association of University Professors, Central State
University Chapter ("AAUP"), is the certified collective bargaining
agent for full-time faculty members at defendant-appellant and cross-appellee,
At the time the parties
entered into this agreement, the provisions governing faculty workload were
appropriate subjects for collective bargaining under R.C. 4117.08(A), and
binding on the parties under R.C. 4117.10(A). However, while the agreement
was in effect, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 3345.45 as part of
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 152, 145 "On or before January 1,
1994, the "On or before June 30,
1994, the board of trustees of each state university shall take formal action
to adopt a faculty workload policy consistent with the standards developed
under this section. Notwithstanding section 4117.08 of the Revised Code, the
policies adopted under this section are not appropriate subjects for
collective bargaining. Notwithstanding division (A) of section 4117.10 of
the Revised Code, any policy adopted under this section by a board of
trustees prevails over any conflicting provisions of any collective
bargaining agreement between an employees organization and that board of
trustees." (Emphasis added.) Also enacted as part of
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 152, Section 84.14, uncodified, provides: "Pursuant to section
3345.45 of the Revised Code, the Ohio Board of Regents shall work with state
universities to ensure that no later than fall term 1994 a minimum ten per
cent increase in statewide undergraduate teaching activity be achieved to
restore the reductions experienced over the past decade. Notwithstanding
section 3345.45 of the Revised Code, any collective bargaining agreement in
effect on the effective date of this act shall continue in effect until its
expiration date." (Emphasis added.) 145 On April 15, 1994, AAUP and
CSU began negotiations for a successor agreement. On June 16, 1994, CSU unilaterally
adopted a new workload policy pursuant to R.C. 3345.45, which it later
amended in November 1994. That policy, as amended, provides: "The normal full-time
teaching load will be a range of 36 to 40 contact hours per academic year.
The normal teaching load in any quarter will not exceed 15 contact hours.
Faculty members shall have at least ten office hours distributed over the
five day work week." On July 28, 1994, CSU notified
AAUP that it would not bargain over the issue of faculty workload, "as faculty
workload is no longer subject to the collective bargaining process as a
result of House Bill 152." However, the parties entered into an
agreement on December 14, 1994, as follows: "In the event that a
court of competent jurisdiction rules that O.R.C. 3345.45 is
unconstitutional, or otherwise finds that the University and AAUP must or can
bargain concerning faculty workload, the provisions of this article [Article
19] shall be reopened, and the University and AAUP shall commence
negotiations concerning faculty workload." Meanwhile, the parties
continued to operate under the terms and conditions of the 1991-1994
agreement while bargaining on issues other than workload. On May 17, 1995, AAUP filed a
complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and a motion for a
preliminary injunction pursuant to Civ.R. 65(B), alleging that R.C. 3345.45
violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States
Constitutions, and Section 1, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. The trial
court ordered trial on the merits of the action to be advanced and
consolidated with the hearing on the application for preliminary injunction,
in accordance with Civ.R. 65(B)(2). Following an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court denied AAUP's requests for declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief, and held R.C. 3345.45 to be constitutional in its
entirety. In so doing, the court found: "The legislature had a
legitimate governmental purpose in the enactment of Ohio Revised Code Section
3345.45. The legitimate governmental purpose is to recapture the ten (10%)
percent decline in teaching that had occurred in undergraduate teaching in
State four (4) year universities, thereby enhancing the quality of
undergraduate education at four (4) year State institutions. Another legitimate
governmental purpose is to reallocate faculty attention to teaching and away
from research. The legislative purpose also was to ensure that all State four
(4) year universities uniformly implement workload policy consistent with the
universities' mission. "The collective
bargaining language contained in Ohio Revised Code Section 3345.45 represents
a legitimate governmental purpose as it enables the legislature to ensure
that the ten (10%) percent decline will be recaptured uniformly by
departments with the state universities consistent with each university's
individual mission. "Ohio Revised Code
Section 3345.45 bears a rational relationship to the legitimate government
purpose. Ohio Revised Code 3345.45 requires the State universities to
implement workload policies designed to recapture the ten (10%) percent
decline in instructional teaching. The collective bargaining provision
contained in Ohio Revised Code Section 3345.45 ensures that each University
will implement the workload policy consistent with the statute." The court of appeals reversed
the decision of the trial court. In so doing, the appellate court found that
the right to collectively bargain is a fundamental right, and that the trial
court should have employed "intermediate scrutiny,"rather than the
"rational relationship" test, in order to resolve the equal
protection issue. However, the court of appeals did not determine whether
R.C. 3345.45 runs afoul of equal protection, but instead remanded the cause
to the trial court to determine whether the statute serves "important
governmental objectives" and whether the classification contained
therein is "substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives." The cause is now before this
court pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary appeal and cross-appeal. __________________ Benesch, Friedlander,
Coplan & Aronoff, L.L.P., Donald J. Mooney, Jr., James F. DeLeone and
Mark D. Tucker, for
appellee and cross-appellant. Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Lawrence J.
Miltner and Jan A. Neiger, Assistant Attorneys General, for
appellant and cross-appellee. Snyder, Rakay & Spicer
and Peter J. Rakay,
for amicus curiae Ohio Education Association. Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Lawrence J.
Miltner, Assistant Attorney General, for amicus curiae Ohio Board
of Regents. __________________ ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. The primary issue confronting the
court today is whether R.C. 3345.45 violates the Equal Protection Clauses of
the The Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall * * *
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." Section 2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides that
"[a]ll political power is inherent in the people. Government is
instituted for their equal protection and benefit * * *." These two
provisions are functionally equivalent, and the standards for determining
violations of equal protection are essentially the same under state and
federal law. State ex rel. Dayton Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 44
v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 22 OBR 1, 5, 488
N.E.2d 181, 185; Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept. (1994), 70
Ohio St.3d 351, 353, 639 N.E.2d 31, 33. Accordingly, we will consider the
propriety of R.C. 3345.45 under both of these constitutional provisions as a
single question. The standards for determining
whether a law runs afoul of equal protection generally involve identifying
the means and ends of the law at issue and examining the relationship between
them. If the means employed by the law at issue create separate classes of
persons who receive different treatment, the laws will be tested under the
equal protection guarantee. Otherwise, if no distinctions are drawn and no
classifications are created, there is no reason to subject the law to equal
protection scrutiny. See State ex rel. Doersam v. Indus. Comm. (1989),
45 Ohio St.3d 115, 120, 543 N.E.2d 1169, 1174; State v. Thompkins
(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 558, 561, 664 N.E.2d 926, 929. There is no question that R.C.
3345.45 legislatively creates discrete classes of persons who receive
differential treatment. The statute isolates university faculty members as
the only public employees as defined in R.C. 4117.01(C) who are precluded
from collectively bargaining over their workload. However, the mere fact that
R.C. 3345.45 creates separate classes of persons does not render it suspect
under the Equal Protection Clause. "The demand for 'equal protection'
cannot be a demand that laws apply universally to all persons. By the very
nature of the work of the legislature, it must, if it is to act at all,
impose special burdens upon or grant special benefits to special groups or
classes of individuals." Doersam, supra, 45 Generally, "[a] statutory
classification which involves neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution if the
classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest."
Klepper v. R.C. 3345.45 involves neither
a suspect class nor a fundamental right. Although the court of appeals raised
forceful arguments as to the value and importance of collective bargaining in
In an effort to defend the
court of appeals' analysis, AAUP claims that this court applied a heightened
level of scrutiny to a statute denying certain Dayton municipal employees the
collective bargaining rights enjoyed by other similarly situated municipal
employees in State ex rel. Dayton Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 44,
supra. AAUP argues that by framing the issue to be whether the The determinative issue in
this case is, therefore, whether R.C. 3345.45 bears a rational relation to a
legitimate governmental interest. In considering this issue, we are guided by
the principles that all legislative enactments enjoy a strong presumption of
constitutionality and that, under rational-basis scrutiny, a legislative
distinction will be upheld if there exists any conceivable set of facts to
justify it. See Fabrey, supra, 70 The goal of R.C. 3345.45, as
set forth in Section 84.14 of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 152, is "to ensure that no
later than fall term 1994, a minimum ten percent increase in statewide
undergraduate teaching activity be achieved to restore the reductions
experienced over the past decade." The record suggests, and the parties
agree, that the object of this legislation is not to increase total faculty
workload, but to effect a change in the ratio between faculty activities in
order to correct the imbalance between research and teaching at four-year
undergraduate state institutions created by a faculty reward system which
prizes research over teaching. Intrinsically, this is a concern over the
quality of undergraduate education and, therefore, is a legitimate
governmental interest. The fact that the General
Assembly chose to correct only the decline in teaching-related activity at
this time, rather than attempt to address all at once the various factors
that the record suggests have contributed to the instability of higher
education in Ohio, does not diminish the legitimacy of its interest. "It
is generally recognized that when a legislative body chooses to act to
correct a given evil it need not correct all the evil at once, but it may proceed
step-by-step." State v. Buckley (1968), 16 However, the existence of a
legitimate governmental interest will not enable the legislative
classification to pass constitutional muster if the party attacking the
legislation can show that there is no rational basis for the differential
treatment. Many of the arguments advanced by CSU and its supporting amicus
curiae, Ohio Board of Regents, seek to establish a general relationship
between faculty workload and quality of education, or to justify treating
differently the faculty at two- and four-year institutions. Such arguments,
however, miss the mark, as they fail to address the essential question of
whether there exists a rational basis for placing faculty members in a class
by themselves as the only public employees as defined in R.C. 4117.01(C)
denied the right to collectively bargain over their workload. On this precise issue, CSU and
the Ohio Board of Regents argue that in order to recoup the ten-percent
decline in teaching, it is necessary to achieve uniformity, consistency, and
equity in terms of faculty workload by university mission, and that
collective bargaining produces considerable variation in faculty workload
across the universities in departments having the same academic mission. In
support of its position, CSU submitted as evidence to the trial court the
following reports published prior and subsequent to the enactment of R.C.
3345.45: Report, Legislative Office of Education Oversight, The Faculty
Reward System in Public Universities (July 1993); Report of the Managing for
the Future Task Force, Challenges & Opportunities for Higher Education in
Ohio (July 1992); Report of the Regents' Advisory Committee on Faculty
Workload Standards & Guidelines (Feb. 18, 1994); Report of the Regents'
Advisory Committee on Faculty Workload, The Evaluation & Reward of
Teaching (June 1994); A Report of the Ohio Board of Regents, Securing the
Future of Higher Education in Ohio (Dec. 1992); and the Basic Data Series, a
biennial publication of tables reflecting statistical data collected from
Ohio colleges and universities. |
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